The Denial of Citizenship: “Barbaric” Buenos Aires and the Middle-Class Imaginary by Guano, Emanuela
Georgia State University
ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University
Anthropology Faculty Publications Department of Anthropology
2004
The Denial of Citizenship: “Barbaric” Buenos Aires
and the Middle-Class Imaginary
Emanuela Guano
Georgia State University, eguano@gsu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/anthro_facpub
Part of the Anthropology Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Anthropology at ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Anthropology Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. For more
information, please contact scholarworks@gsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Guano, Emanuela, "The Denial of Citizenship: “Barbaric” Buenos Aires and the Middle-Class Imaginary" (2004). Anthropology Faculty
Publications. 18.
https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/anthro_facpub/18
 1 
Emanuela Guano 
 
 
The Denial of Citizenship: “Barbaric” Buenos Aires 
and the Middle-Class Imaginary 
 
 
 
Published in City and Society, 1 (2004): 69-97 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper explores how, in the Buenos Aires of neoliberalism, middle-class 
residents strove to make sense of their own impoverishment and their 
disenfranchisement by generating a consensus on how this city’s modernity was being 
eroded by the presence of a large mestizo lower class. Through an analysis of the 
discourse that constructed the urban poor as “barbaric” (i.e., dangerous, polluting, and 
foreign), I suggest that this representation not only sought to reinforce the fading 
social difference between the middle- and the lower class, but it also contributed to 
denying the latter its citizenship in a Buenos Aires that struggled to be “modern”. 
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The Denial of Citizenship: “Barbaric” Buenos Aires 
and the Middle-Class Imaginary 
 
 
Introduction 
María1 lives in a condominium located in what she defines as a solidly middle-
class area of the Greater Buenos Aires. Like many middle-class Buenos Aires 
residents, María, too, has seen better times.  For several years she has been struggling 
to make a living from her small shop in the microcentro, which she inherited from her 
father. Her wealthy aristocratic family migrated from Europe during World War II; 
their first residence in Buenos Aires had been a sumptuous petit hotel in the elegant 
Barrio Norte. Even though María had led a privileged lifestyle well into the 1970s, 
since then things have changed dramatically for her, too. When I met her in 1997, her 
two children were unemployed, and her business was not doing well, either. 
On one of my frequent visits, I happened to notice a man sitting on the 
threshold of the house next door to her triplex. His disheveled appearance struck me 
as somewhat out of place for that part of the city, but my reading remained 
subconscious until my friend brought up the issue. When María saw the man, her 
broad smile immediately contracted into an expression of distress. “Did you see 
them?” she whispered as she dragged me inside her gate and quickly locked it behind 
us. Rumor had it that the condominium next to hers was housing a group of squatters. 
“Seven men” she added. “All ladrones (thieves) who just came out of a penitentiary. 
All Paraguayans and Bolivians of the worst kind, didn’t you see their faces?” I asked 
her how she knew, and she replied that her neighbor had heard it from the owner of 
the small grocery shop across the street.  
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Apparently, the whole street was in turmoil about this unwanted presence. 
“Yes, we are all scared: once they move in, they start watching your every movement. 
You can’t leave your house empty, not even for an hour, because they’ll break in and 
steal everything. Plus, they’ll pick your phone line to call God knows where. Look at 
my latest bill: over a hundred pesos, whereas all my previous bills were all about 
twenty pesos. And I hardly called anybody…” María’s daughter volunteered more 
information: “[Our neighbors] say this is an aguantadero (refuge): these are all 
criminals who moved in to keep an eye on the neighborhood.” Then, waving her 
hands in circles to simulate a centrifugal movement, she concluded: “Once they find 
another suitable place, they call in more of their people and settle into that, too.” “Do 
you know what they do once they move into somebody’s place?—María interjected--
They remove all the metal parts they find—pipes, taps, doorknobs, everything--and 
sell it as chatarra (scrap metal). And if they find hardwood floors they’ll burn them to 
barbecue their beef. Te das cuenta, do you understand what class of people they are?” 
María’s experience of a proximity to a social difference that she perceived as 
both intrusive and threatening was hardly unique in the Buenos Aires of the late 
1990s, a time when the social and spatial boundaries between the local middle-class 
and the urban poor were increasingly thinning. The way María represented her new 
neighbors was part of a common strategy of reproducing social difference through a 
discourse that posited a white, middle-class, and modern “normalcy” as the only 
legitimate modality for spatial and cultural citizenship in Buenos Aires.  
By defining social space as “a locus, a medium, and a tool” of the perpetuation 
of social inequality, in his Production of Space Lefebvre (1991:32) argued that 
discrimination is spatially reproduced through a discursive economy of 
representations that valorize “certain relationships between people in particular 
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places” (1991:56), thus generating “consensuses” on these places as well as the 
identity and ownership of those who dwell in them (ibid.). A consensus over what 
qualities define an ideal urban space can be an exclusionary strategy that supports a 
social group’s entitlement to the city while physically and/or symbolically evicting its 
“others.” The denial of a marginal group’s “right to the city” is what Lefebvre 
elsewhere (1996) categorized as the alienation of the right to inhabit urban space by 
dwelling in it and using it on one’s own terms.  Drawing on this notion, in this essay I 
explore the discourse and practices through which, in the late 1990s, middle-class 
Buenos Aires residents who faced their own impoverishment strove to generate a 
consensus on Buenos Aires as a quintessentially white and middle-class city whose 
“modernity” was being eroded by the presence of a large mestizo lower class. As it 
reinforced representations of a white and “civilized” middle-classness, this narrative 
sanctioned segregation and exclusion by generating normative cartographies of 
“belonging” that blended a sense of ownership of things and places with a stylistically 
and performatively reiterated membership in a social group (Fortier 1999:42), thus 
establishing not only what belonged to whom, but also who belonged where, and who 
belonged nowhere. 
 
Modernization through the Looking Glass 
The Buenos Aires middle-class--the largest of its own kind in the whole Latin 
American continent—was mostly formed by the offspring of the European 
immigrants who flooded Argentina between 1870 and 1930 as part of this country’s 
postcolonial modernization project (Svampa 1992, Rock 1985, Germani 1964). 
Throughout the 1900s, this social group kept claiming its own participation in elitist 
mythologies of metropolitan modernity: representations of civilizaciòn and barbarie 
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originally disseminated by Domingo Faustino Sarmiento, the founding father and first 
president of the Argentine Republic. By picturing mestizos and indigenas as ignorant, 
violent, and primitive, i.e., lacking cultural proficiency in the unspoken and unwritten 
rules of bourgeois metropolitan modernity, these categorizations provided the 
dominant classes with an ideal of citizenship that justified the eviction of the subaltern 
from the urban sphere.2  At the end of the century, old/new modernity narratives 
continued to haunt the social imaginary of the Buenos Aires’ middle-class. 
As suggested by Gaonkar (2002:4), social imaginaries are held together by 
shared self-understandings that “underlie and make possible common practices,” and 
are “embedded in the habitus of a population or are carried in modes of address, 
stories, symbols, and the like”. Much like Gramsci’s “common sense” as that “already 
formed and ‘taken for granted’ terrain, on which more coherent ideologies and 
philosophies must contend for mastery” (in Hall 1986:20), a social imaginary is the 
medium through which a social group both understands and (re)produces the world it 
lives in. Though sedimented with inherited representations, social imaginaries are 
deeply situated in their current and ever-shifting sociopolitical settings. As they re-
contextualize representations and practices, they provide a seemingly orderly map for 
orienting oneself amidst the disorder of social life (Comaroff and Comaroff 1992:30).  
After a decade of neoliberal propaganda centered on Argentina’s 
modernization and its miracolous inclusion into the first world, in the late 1990s the 
social imaginary of the Buenos Aires’ middle class was informed by notions of 
modernity that, in many respects, were reminiscent of the constructs that had helped 
legitimize bourgeois privilege in the postcolonial nation (Guano 2002). However, 
pace the official rhetoric, by the end of the twentieth century the Buenos Aires’ 
middle strata found themselves confronting what Ferguson (2002:137) called 
 6 
“modernization through the looking glass”: a foreseeable future of poverty in a third 
world country where everyday life experience not only contradicted the neoliberal 
narrative of progress towards first world status, but blatantly turned it upside down.  
As a 1999 INDEC statistics shows, during the same year about 80% of the 
Buenos Aires population found itself living below the poverty line, i.e. earned less 
than the 1,030 pesos/U.S. dollars needed for the survival of a family of four. The main 
cause of this impoverishment was the political and economic course that was pursued 
by the 1989-1999 neoliberal/neoperonist government led by President Carlos Saùl 
Menem, and that had been widely acclaimed by conservative economists as the 
“Argentine miracle”. Between 1991 and 2002, the Argentine peso was pegged to the 
US dollar: as a result, the local manufacturing sector all but vanished under the flow 
of imported goods that quickly found their way into Argentina. Unemployment rates 
soared. At the same time, essential public services were privatized, and thus made 
more difficult to access. A decade of neoliberal reforms rearranged the Buenos Aires’ 
society along a pattern whose contour increasingly resembled the asymmetrical 
hourglass described by Gibson (1997) in her analysis of inequality in late capitalist 
societies. At the top of this imaginary hourglass was the tiny and extremely wealthy 
elite that had not only profited from the privatization spree, but had also successfully 
converted to the import business. The base of the hourglass was formed by the 
increasingly unemployed working class, as well as by the quickly expanding ranks of 
the poor. Between the mid-1970s and the mid-1990s, these two social groups had lost 
32.8% of their income (Minujín and Kessler 1995). The situation of the middle-
classes was equally polarized. Whereas a small segment of the upper middle-class 
found its niche in the new service economy at the managerial-professional level, the 
Buenos Aires’ middle- and lower- middle-classes kept sinking into poverty. By the 
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late 1990s, much of what used to constitute the large Buenos Aires middle-class—a 
middle-class that, still in the 1980s, amounted to 70% of the total Argentine 
population (Minujin and Kessler 1995)—had been deprived not only of many of its 
traditional sources of white-collar employment, but also of the access to the public 
services that had characterized the Peronist welfare state. 3  While the upper class had 
increased its revenues by 21.2%, between the mid-1970s and the mid-1990s the lower 
middle-class had lost 22.3% of its income, and the middle middle-class had lost 
12.5% (the largest loss in financial volume).4 Soon enough, the results of President 
Menem’s much vaunted “surgery without anesthesia” were under everybody’s eyes—
especially those of a middle-class that was painfully conscious of its own decline. 
At the time of my 1997-1998 fieldwork, the awareness of this process of 
impoverishment had transformed the daily conversations of middle-class individuals 
into arenas for the exchange of fears. “Will the middle-class disappear as they say?” 
was the question many kept asking. Their anxiety found an obsessive echo in the 
headlines of local and national newspapers, for which “la caida de la clase media,” 
the fall of the middle-class, had become a trope. As more and more middle-class 
families slipped below the poverty line, the hopelessness became increasingly 
palpable. While telling me about how their European grandparents had sought and 
found their fortune in Argentina, my middle-class friends and acquaintances 
consistently declared their fear at being caught in an endlessly declining parable that 
reversed their ancestors’ successes, and brought them every day a step closer to the 
slum. To many of them, their proximity to a quickly growing lower class epitomized 
both a symbolic and a material threat: a threat they strove to fend off by enhancing 
difference while discursively reconstituting their own white, and modern, middle-
classness.5   
 8 
 
Between First and Third World 
While, as Sebreli (1992:83) put it, the Buenos Aires bourgeoisie lived in its own 
“private world of gated neighborhoods, hermetically sealed houses, and fast cars,” the 
local middle-classes continued to share the city with the urban poor. In the elegant 
microcentro, crowds of white-collar employees rushed daily to and from their offices 
parading the latest fashion accessory--which, for the most part, they had purchased on 
credit, and paid for in endless installments and at a very high interest rate. Adrift in 
the mass of those who were struggling to keep up with the requirements of taste and 
fashion, the growing numbers of peddlers, panhandlers, homeless and slum-dwellers 
provided a striking counterpoint to the performative narrative of metropolitan 
elegance. Yet both publics inhabited the same spaces, and most of their public 
interactions were modulated along (and only occasionally across) the lines of their 
class differences. Most of the time, the script followed in these public interactions was 
one of “civil inattention” (Goffman 1963), or better a form of coexistence whereby 
members of different social classes ostensibly ignored each other (Sampson 
2003:182), and occasionally approached one another in a more or less unthreatening 
manner.  
Every now and then, middle-class individuals would stop at a vendor’s stall to 
purchase a lottery ticket or roasted peanuts, or they would slow their steps to slip a 
few coins into the outstretched hand of a beggar. Peddlers would board crowded trains 
and buses carrying loads of small toys, sewing implements, and other household tools. 
After installing themselves into the most visible spot in the vehicle, they would chant 
their advertising litanies to their captive audiences. Some passengers would roll their 
eyes, resenting the intrusion into the solitude supposedly granted by such non-places 
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(Augé 1995). Others listened, and then perhaps bought a little something: a crayon 
box or a pair of scissors sold at an exceptionally low price. Customers at local 
confiterías (coffee shops) and restaurants also grew used to having their conversations 
frequently interrupted by the procession of panhandlers dropping a small object—
perhaps a pen, or a card featuring a Catholic saint--at every table before returning to 
collect un pesito (one peso, i.e., the equivalent of one US dollar) in payment for the 
item. 
And yet, as they went about their daily routines, both lower- and middle-class 
Buenos Aires residents were constantly aware of the possibility of encroachment, and 
even aggression, that loomed in the background. On one hand, the transgressions 
included physical violence in the form of the muggings and kidnappings that the 
middle-class increasingly feared, as well as police harassment and the arbitrary 
detentions of low-income dark-skinned individuals: a practice that brutally reiterated 
its victims’ out-of-placeness in the “Paris of the Río de la Plata”. On the other hand, 
symbolic violence pervaded the disdainful top-down gazes (Grimson 1999:37-38), the 
racist and classist jokes (Edelstein 1999), and the insults that were occasionally 
dropped on mestizos, the poor, and the immigrants (or those who were thought to be 
such). Often used interchangeably, slurs like cabecita negra (little black head), negro, 
villero (slum-dweller) bolita (pejorative for boliviano: Bolivian), contributed to 
collapsing a variety of class, race, and national/ethnic classifications into a large 
category that marked poor, dark-skinned individuals as “not belonging” in white 
Buenos Aires. Yet another, and equally pernicious, form of symbolic violence was the 
widespread habit of blaming these “others” for Argentina’s predicaments. Confronted 
with a high unemployment rate, working class individuals, for example, would 
occasionally vent their resentment against the “extranjeros indocumentados” 
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(“undocumented foreigners”, i.e., illegal immigrants) who allegedly “stole their jobs” 
by agreeing to work for much lower wages (Grimson 1999:38-39). Middle-class 
Buenos Aires residents, instead, were more likely to blame the non-white lower 
classes for Argentina’s poverty, its corruption, and its disconnect from modernity 
(Guano 2003). In this discourse, old tropes of civilization and barbarism were 
recontextualized through the terminology of modernization promoted once again by 
the neoliberal regime.  
At a time when President Menem and his government kept announcing 
Argentina’s imminent inclusion into the first world (Guano 2002), many middle-class 
Buenos Aires residents voiced their discomfort with the increasing closeness to the 
poverty that kept materializing in the streets of the city: a poverty that, they feared, 
was about to swallow them along with their self-ascribed modernity. As the primary 
location of their everyday experience of social difference, to them the city had 
become the stage of Buenos Aires’ modernity drama—a drama where, as McDonogh 
(1991:324) once put it, urban life actors had come to embody categories in this social 
group’s symbolic universe.  
“Menem says that Argentina is the first world, but here it’s like being in 
Bolivia” was the trope that often glossed the presence of peddlers and panhandlers in 
Buenos Aires’ microcentro. As the poorest country in Latin America and the place of 
origin of the largest immigrant group in Buenos Aires,6 “Bolivia” epitomized what 
Koptiuch (1996) once called a “third world at home”: an intrusive presence that 
disrupted dominant representations of Buenos Aires as a white, middle-class, and 
“European” city.7 Its reterritorialization at the heart of Buenos Aires was both an 
explicitly sarcastic retort against the official rhetoric of Argentine neoliberalism, and 
an implicit wish to see Buenos Aires restored to its pristine modernity.  
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The neoliberal government--it had become clear to many--had little interest in 
protecting the middle-classes.8 In the perceived absence of institutional policies and 
interventions, everyday strategies such as spatial segregation, symbolic evictions, and 
the construction of social invisibility were among the measures enacted to contain the 
alleged intrusion. All of these strategies had deep roots in the local history of class 
struggle. 
 
The Denial of Citizenship 
As Mitchell (2003) suggested, dominant social groups may prevent urban 
space from becoming more “public”—hence more inclusive--by tailoring the rules for 
spatial practice on themselves. As they claim to embody the legitimate urban public, 
these groups attempt to undermine the right to the city of those who fail to comply 
with the dominant prescriptions for belonging. It is through social struggle that 
marginal social groups can strive to establish a “space for representation” (2003: 33) 
where it is possible for them to become socially and politically visible. A space for 
representation is an arena where one can posit oneself, and be publicly acknowledged, 
as a citizen: a legitimate member of “the public,” and a political actor endowed with 
the right to advance claims about what reality is and should be. 
 Throughout the twentieth century, much of the struggle over visibility in the 
Buenos Aires’ urban sphere was closely connected to the clash over the cultural and 
political citizenship of the subaltern: the thousands who lived in the slums, the 
tenements, and the working class barrios at the margins of the bourgeois city. It was 
between 1945 and 1955 that the socially and politically mandated invisibility of the 
Buenos Aires lower classes was finally shattered—even though only temporarily. 
During this time, Perón’s army of the “shirtless” (descamisados) succeeded in 
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appropriating Buenos Aires’ bourgeois downtown as its own “space for 
representation”: an arena where it could exert the role of the most visible public of 
Peronism. As the physical embodiment of the pueblo argentino (the Argentine 
people), the poor could be periodically seen as they acclaimed Perón and his wife 
Evita in raucous ceremonies held in Plaza de Mayo. Most supporters of Perón’s 1946-
1955 government were members of those mestizo lower classes that had been 
consistently disenfranchised by the elites and their governments, as well as by many 
of those who opposed them. Poor, dark-skinned Argentines had also been consistently 
excluded from the vision of social justice that was upheld by immigrant European 
socialist activists (Walter 1977). By bringing a mass of mestizo workers and 
lumpenproletarians to the heart of Buenos Aires, Perón launched a symbolic 
aggression against the white middle and upper classes (Foster 1998:6; Ciria 
1983:277).9 Under his presidency, the bourgeois city became a stage for the 
glorification of a proudly self-referential barbarism and its challenge to the 
exclusionary civilization of the elite (Svampa 1992).10  
In 1955, however, the reactionary coup that overthrew the Peronist regime 
pushed the Buenos Aires’ poor back into political and social invisibility. As Peronist 
discourse and imageries were banned from the public sphere, a sequel of authoritarian 
conservative regimes returned Perón’s “pueblo argentino” to the status of the “rabble” 
that had to be kept out of sight. Their presence in an urban sphere dominated by the 
middle and upper classes was still categorized at best as invisible, and at worst as that 
of the intrusive Other.  During the 1976-1983 dictatorial Process of National 
Reorganization, the rules for the performance of an appropriate citizenship in Buenos 
Aires’ downtown plazas were set by the military regime, and those who transgressed 
them were often abducted, tortured, and murdered by the army (Taylor 1997). 
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Continuously at risk of being “disappeared” by the army or having their meager 
property bulldozed overnight (Auyero 2000b:60), the residents of the shantytowns 
were evicted not just from the Buenos Aires’ public sphere, but also from the city 
space itself. In 1977, the military junta introduced a Ley de Erradicación (law of 
eradication) that banned villas from the Federal Capital: the following year, Buenos 
Aires was to host the World Soccer Championship, and the sight of urban slums 
would have tainted Buenos Aires’ international reputation as a most civilized “Paris 
of Latin America.” As a result, at least 200,000 people were evicted from their 
shantytowns in Buenos Aires city, and many more were denied access to downtown. 
Democracy was reinstated in Argentina in 1983. A year later, a new law was issued 
that countermanded the Ley de Erradicación (Keeling 1996:103-106). However, under 
the neoliberal regime of the 1990s, the citizenship of shantytown-dwellers was still in 
question. 
While Menem’s government kept stubbornly denying the existence of a 
soaring poverty rate in Argentina, by the late 1990s the population of the Buenos 
Aires’ shantytowns had reached 86,666 (Auyero 2000b:62). 11 In the meantime, a 
discourse perpetuated by much of the middle-class contributed to denying the 
citizenship of the poor.12 
The consensus among members of the middle-class was that the vicinity of a 
villa constituted a threat. Residents of areas that host slums or asientamentos (small 
pockets of self-help housing) were particularly vocal about the danger allegedly 
posited by these settlements and their inhabitants.13 Villas, many of them pointed out, 
brought about drugs, prostitution, criminality, and disease.14  Inevitably, this 
representation helped reproduce social invisibility through patterns of stigma, 
avoidance, and segregation. Many of my informants expressed anxiety at the thought 
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of even driving—let alone walking--near a slum: as an interviewee put it, “if you stop 
at a traffic light [near a villa], they’ll come and mug you”. Not surprisingly, several of 
my acquaintances and interviewees had lived their entire lives in Buenos Aires 
without having ever entered a villa. “If you walk into a villa,” I kept being told, “you 
will never be able to walk out. It’s too dangerous for you to go there.” A frequent 
concern was that, in the villas, streets had no names: a fact that many middle-class 
individuals found puzzling, since to them this lack of orderliness and specification 
would make the task of orienting oneself basically impossible. Apparently, many 
institutions were equally uneasy in dealing with the villas: even the census was done 
rarely, and mostly at a distance, approximated on the basis of a presumed number of 
inhabitants per square-kilometer.15 Not only did the white middle-class gaze fail to 
discern qualities and quantities of the people of the villa, but, in the hegemonic 
categorization of place and identity, villas and the people who inhabited them also 
embodied the negation of modern urban life. In addition, since villas should not have 
been there, their presence was stubbornly denied even by the official cartography. 
Looking for them on any Buenos Aires map would have been a waste of time: none of 
them was reported anyway.16 As an example of what Harley (1988) called the 
cartographic “silences” that exclude unacceptable aspects of the landscape, this spatial 
invisibility was instrumental to the symbolic ousting of slum-dwellers not only from 
the city, but also from the Argentine nation as imagined in middle-class Buenos Aires.  
As Zhang (2002) proposed, the boundary between national and spatial 
citizenship is a porous zone marked by a traffic in entitlements and exclusions. There 
is a deep connection between the right to belong in the city and the right to be 
included and represented in a nation whose essence is often construed as grounded in 
geographical space. Both types of citizenship—which Holston (1999:169) calls 
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respectively “substantive” and “formal”--are brought into being through the workings 
of social imagination. Both emerge as membership in a community that not only 
comes into existence by attaining public visibility in a space that is physical and social 
at once, but also constitutes itself as a legitimate public precisely through its claim to 
“its” place (Mitchell 2003:148). In the case of the Buenos Aires’ slum-dwellers, their 
loss of the right to the city foreshadowed an erosion of their national citizenship. In 
middle-class discourse, the disconnectedness of the slum from the larger society 
(Auyero 2000a:98) was powerfully indexed by, and reproduced through, the trope of 
foreignness.  
In the late 1990s, a common perception about villas was that they were 
inhabited exclusively by extranjeros indocumentados, undocumented foreigners.17 
Based on phenotypical categorizations that posited porteños18 as white, and dark-
skinned individuals as necessarily from elsewhere, these perceptions perpetuated the 
myth of Buenos Aires’ essential Europeanness. Not only would many from the 
Buenos Aires middle-class firmly believe that Bolivian, Peruvian, and Paraguayan 
immigrants outnumbered the Argentine residents in the villas (a perception that was 
invariably disputed by those who lived in the slums, as well as by those who worked 
there), but several of them were also hesitant to extend the (implicitly white and 
middle-class) category of “porteño” even to those villa residents whom they identified 
as Argentine. Hardly unique to middle-class common sense, the representation of the 
foreignness of slum dwellers occasionally spilled into the sphere of official political 
discourse. In 1998, a high-ranking politician declared in a televised interview that 
“there are no Argentines in the villas,” but only illegal immigrants. Residents of a few 
Buenos Aires’ shantytowns responded with a small round of street protests. “We are all 
Argentines,” their banners read. Yet this public protest did little to alter the hegemonic 
 16 
representation, and shantytown-dwellers kept being routinely referred to as 
undocumented foreigners.  
 
Defiling Identities 
The out-of-placeness of the poor in Buenos Aires—their foreignness to the 
modern city--was reiterated through the pervasive representation of the “danger” that, 
to paraphrase Mary Douglas (1966), they allegedly posited to the “purity” of middle-
class spaces. The discourse that constructs marginals as agents of defilement, too, has 
deep roots in the classifications of class and race that emerged out of modernity 
(Stepan 1991, Sibley 1995), and that, in postcolonial Argentina, legitimized the 
civilizing mission of the Europeanized porteño elites. Until well into the twentieth 
century, hegemonic representations of hygiene and morality in Buenos Aires had been 
a staple of eugenic attempts to isolate a pure national body from the defiling presence 
of subaltern social groups: blacks, mestizos, Amerindians, immigrants, and the poor 
(Stepan 1991, Salessi 1995).19 In the late 1990s, fragments of this discourse continued 
to be recontextualized in the social imaginary of the middle-class. Non-white 
individuals, for example, were occasionally referred to as having a disturbing “odor,” 
which was attributed to a manifestation of barbarism: a lack of hygiene, as imputed to 
Bolivian immigrants, or an unseemly diet, as in the case of Koreans, whom many 
accused of “eating cats”. Needless to say, villa residents were particularly vulnerable 
targets for this negative signifying process.  
Not only did most Buenos Aires’ shantytowns lack sewers and access to clean 
water (except for a few public taps), but their cesspools also contributed to 
compounding the sanitation problem. At the time of my fieldwork, malnutrition, HIV, 
tuberculosis, and asthma were on the rise among villa and tenement dwellers all over 
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the city. In addition, scavenging for food, clothes, and recyclable goods was a 
common survival tactic among the Buenos Aires’ poor.20 Every night, a number of 
people flocked out of the shantytowns to look for food in the trash bags piling up at 
each street corner. The scavengers were called cirujas—perhaps because, a bit like 
cirujanos (surgeons), the urban poor made a living out of dissecting and searching 
organic matter.21 Among middle-class residents, such a daily spectacle of poverty 
evoked a plethora of reactions ranging from a compassion often laced with anger at 
the government (“before neoliberalism kicked in, Argentina was a country where even 
the poor ate beef every day” was a common refrain), to the resentment against the 
shantytown-dwellers themselves (“it serves them right: they all voted for the Peronist 
party, look what they got,” 22 was yet another anti-Peronist/anti-neoliberal 
commonplace).23 Another prevalent emotion was the concern that scavenging would 
result in a proliferation of rats, roaches, and possibly even diseases that--some kept 
pointing out--would be unheard of in really civilized cities. As one woman put it upon 
spotting a family intent on cutting trash bags at the corner of her apartment complex: 
“I cannot imagine that something like this could ever happen in “real” first world 
cities like London or Paris, don’t you think?”.24 While the spatial separation between 
the “clean” first world and bourgeois city on one hand, and the “dirty” slum on the 
other was impossible to enforce, the perception that trespassing caused contamination 
served to reproduce not just the conceptual boundary (Pellow 1996) between the 
middle-class self and its lower class other, but also the latter’s out-of-placeness in a 
city that strove to be modern. 
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Fencing out Danger? 
Carefully threaded though they were, the discursive meshes of social 
invisibility invariably failed to fully conceal the presence of poverty from middle-
class experience. As a result, the impossibility of “fencing in” the perceived intruders 
led to attempts to “fence them out”. Throughout the 1990s, gates, walls, and 
surveillance became a more common sight in a city that, many lamented, seemed to 
be on the verge of losing its Parisian openness to become increasingly similar to a 
“Los Angeles” of gated enclaves (Guano 2002). As Pellow (1996:3) pointed out, 
physical and conceptual boundaries are intrinsic to the creation, maintenance, 
transformation, and definition of social relations. In Buenos Aires, the proliferation of 
walls and surveillance went hand in hand with the rise of poverty--by 1999 about 80% 
of the population of Greater Buenos Aires was living below the poverty line25--and it 
signaled a fear of the other that amounted to the criminalization of the poor. The 
social anxiety of the Buenos Aires middle-class helped generate the narrative of an 
extraordinary crime wave plaguing Buenos Aires (ola de inseguridad): a phenomenon 
that is characteristic of the socio-spatial reorganization of the increasingly polarized 
societies of neoliberalism (Caldeira 1996, 2000; Low 2003). A news media industry 
that catered mostly to the urban middle-classes indulged in daily descriptions of 
bloody robberies in restaurants and bars, shoot-outs in trafficked streets and inside 
crowded trains, and senseless violence around soccer stadiums and clubs.26 As the 
news media continued riding the scare wave, police officers kept raiding the Buenos 
Aires’ shantytowns in search for the usual suspects.27 In the meantime, those who 
could afford it built fences and walls around their homes, or hired private security 
firms to protect their apartment complexes. 
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Ironically, those who had hired private security firms to protect their homes 
often ended up living in fear of being burglarized and robbed by these very same 
guards, who inevitably belonged to a less privileged social class.  If surveillance 
systems often grant little more than a symbolic protection to their concerned users 
(Low 2003), in Buenos Aires even gates and fences were occasionally suspected of 
diminishing, rather than increasing, safety. At the time of my fieldwork, the residents 
of single-family homes were becoming more and more worried about being followed 
home by robbers. After sneaking past the gate, the criminals would lock it behind 
themselves. Once inside, they could proceed to attack their victims, protected by the 
same privacy and barriers that the latter had created for their own security. The 
anxiety this feeling of vulnerability triggered often caused even progressive 
individuals to blurt out that, during the military Proceso, crime rates had been much 
lower than under the current democratic regime. While the statement was usually 
framed as a matter-of-fact observation about an objective reality, the negative 
comparison it posited pitted the “order” of totalitarianism against the “disorder” of 
democracy (Mitchell 2003), thus implicitly indicting the social inclusiveness of the 
latter and the openness of urban space as one of its mediums.28  
 
The Villa from Within 
In his Casa Tomada, the Argentine novelist Julio Cortázar (1969) offered a 
metaphorical insight into the dynamics of trespassing and the struggle over space and 
identity between the Buenos Aires’ middle-class and the urban poor. The protagonist 
and narrator of Cortázar’s story is a middle-aged man who lives in his large ancestral 
house with his sister Irene. Irene and the narrator cherish the house, because it is 
saturated with mementos of their family’s previous generations. Both characters are 
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unmarried. Both engage in gendered—and unproductive---bourgeois activities. The 
narrator spends his time reading French literature, while Irene knits obsessively. They 
also inherited so much money from their ancestors that they do not need to work. One 
day, the narrator hears steps and whispers in the other wing of the house. Squatters are 
breaking in! He slams the connecting door and locks it. Now he and Irene are left with 
their two bedrooms, the kitchen, and the bathroom, whereas the squatters settle in the 
rest of the house. Yet, their feelings of loss are mitigated by a sense of relief: the 
narrator and Irene still have their essential living space after all, and no longer need to 
clean up all of their dusty ancestral furniture. For a while, the protagonists continue to 
knit and read their French novels, while sharing the house with the invisible 
squatters—whom they never see, but identify only through the muffled noises they 
produce. One fateful night, the narrator hears whispers creep into the kitchen, then 
into the bathroom, then into the corridor leading to his and his sister’s bedrooms. He 
grabs Irene, and runs out of the house. At this point, they have really lost everything 
to the squatters: their house, their belongings, their wealth. Just like the squatters who 
expelled them from their home, now they are left with nothing. However, unlike the 
squatters, they still have their “respectable,” petty bourgeois frame of mind. Before 
leaving the house, the narrator locks the door from outside: “just in case some 
scumbag got the idea of breaking into our home, at this time of the night and with the 
house full of squatters.” 
Thirty years after its first publication, the social critique intrinsic in Cortázar’s 
story has hardly lost its currency. As Cortázar pointed out, the Buenos Aires that had 
been lavishly built by the Europeanized bourgeoisie was “inherited” by a middle-class 
that anchored its entitlement in its past connections to metropolitan modernity. There 
may have been squatters in this city: “invisible” people who were perceived as lacking 
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a legitimate claim to inhabit it (possibly because they did not share this city’s 
European culture). And to a certain extent, for this city’s middle-class residents losing 
a tiny portion of this inherited urban space might have been an endurable pain—as 
long as the squatters were not seen, and only barely heard, and as long as the space 
they occupied was not the middle-class’s own. After all, all over Buenos Aires there 
were plenty of deserted, semi-destroyed buildings that could be silently broken into 
and occupied without creating any significant problems to the rest of the city. But the 
invisible intruders did not limit themselves to occupying far away and unused 
quarters. On the contrary, they spilled right into the living space of the middle-class 
family--its living room, its kitchen, even its bedrooms. In the end, those who felt they 
had “inherited” this urban space risked being evicted and becoming just as poor as the 
squatters, though they retained their distinguished (yet now pathetically useless) 
cultural sensibility.  
Even though squatting was a frequent occurrence in Buenos Aires throughout 
the twentieth century, its incidence increased in the late 1990s, progressing hand in 
hand with the growth of poverty and the unmet demand for affordable housing.29 
Despite the large number of vacant properties,30 apartment rents often exceeded the 
means of many. While many a school teacher or retiree earned less than US$100 a 
month and immigrant construction workers averaged US$5 a day, renting a small 
apartment in Buenos Aires city would usually cost US$200 and above.31 In addition, a 
condition for leasing was the payment of a deposit equivalent to six months of rent. 
Tenement leases did not require a six-month deposit, but rents were still 
comparatively high: in 1998, a dilapidated pieza with shared use of restroom and 
kitchen in one of la Boca’s notorious conventillos would run at around US$ 200 per 
month. As a result of the difficulty in renting legally, squatting incidents became more 
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and more frequent. By 2000, it was estimated that about 200,000 families lived in 
casas tomadas (houses occupied by squatters) scattered all over Buenos Aires.32  
While villas had a larger impact on their surroundings, many felt that their 
contours could be more or less easily mapped. Squatters, instead, were perceived as 
carrying out capillary encroachments that further intensified the drama of infringed 
social and spatial boundaries. Needless to say, the people who felt they were most at 
risk were those who owned property, but often could not afford to guard it through 
expensive fences, gates, and top-of-the-line security systems: in other words, the 
middle- and lower-middle-classes. As they lived in a city they experienced as 
increasingly anomic, many middle-class residents were appalled to see the villa 
emerge from within the places they claimed as their own. The vicinity of a casa 
tomada would often cause a considerable amount of anxiety: the presence of 
squatters, many contended, would increase the incidence of muggings and break-ins 
in the neighborhood. A few of my acquaintances and interviewees had even lost their 
own property to squatters: an event that, they pointed out, had dragged them even 
closer to the brink of poverty.  
For example, Verónica, a retired teacher, had made a living for many years by 
renting out two apartments: one in la Plata and one in la Boca. Her rental property had 
enabled her to support not only herself, but also her unemployed son, his jobless wife, 
and their infant son. In the mid 1990s, however, squatters occupied her apartment in la 
Plata. The complex manager had sold them the key. When Verónica requested their 
eviction, the squatters exhibited a forged lease. The subsequent trial lasted three years, 
during which Verónica lost not only more than half of her meager income, but she 
also had to squander a considerable amount of her savings on legal expenses. By the 
time Verónica had finally managed to evict the squatters, the apartment was so 
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damaged that it could no longer be rented out. Its resale value had diminished 
considerably, too. At the time of our interviews, Verónica was grappling with the 
difficult decision of whether to invest whatever was left of her savings in renovating 
the apartment, or to take a big loss and sell it well below its value. What made her 
particularly bitter was that, before leaving, the squatters had removed all wooden and 
metal parts from her apartment. Her hardwood floors were gone, and so were all the 
knobs, faucets, and even some of the pipes. “They always do that—she informed 
me—they sell taps and pipes as scrap metal, and burn the hardwood planks to 
barbecue their beef.” 
In neoliberal Buenos Aires, definitions of proper and improper use of property 
constituted a battlefield in the war of position over boundaries and livelihood. While 
the poor grappled with the paucity of affordable housing, small property owners felt 
threatened with a damage that, in many cases, could hasten their fall into poverty. 
Faced with the loss of a considerable portion of their income, and, in some cases, even 
the homes they lived in, they felt helpless. They did not expect protection from the 
authorities, either. Given the police’ reputation for corruption and brutality, even 
having to request their intervention was a source of anxiety. Many feared that, upon 
entering a police station, they would be asked to pay bribes, and they would be 
threatened if they refused to comply.33  Moreover, the consensus among property 
owners was that the already slow judiciary system could be easily obstructed through 
fake rental leases.34 All in all, prevention was considered to be the best defense 
against squatters. In some parts of the Greater Buenos Aires, this would involve not 
leaving one’s home unattended for more than one day, even if it meant renouncing 
opportunities for travel and vacation. Several of my acquaintances indicated that an 
important factor in acquiring property was whether it could be effectively guarded 
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against illegal settlers either through a network of friends and relatives who would 
“keep an eye” on their apartment, or, alternatively, by hiring a private security firm. 
Yet, even the onsite presence of private guards and managers was no guarantee of 
protection. Private security officers were often suspected of promoting robberies, and 
dishonest managers had been known to provide squatters with apartment keys and 
even fake leases.  
Horrific stories were exchanged in middle-class circles about how squatters 
hardly limited themselves to using property the way “normal” middle-class owners 
and tenants did. On the contrary, they were almost invariably described as being keen 
on a destruction that was beyond middle class rationality and comprehension.35 
Accounts abounded about how squatters removed all plumbing fixtures to sell them as 
scrap metal, and burned the hardwood floors to barbecue beef. (In other versions of 
this story, a similar destiny would befall doors, windows, banisters, and even marble 
stairs.)36 Rumors, as Kroeger (2003:244) proposed, help redress situations of crisis 
and uncertainty by reinforcing the individual’s membership in a social group while 
simultaneously defining one’s enemies and antagonists. In all the narratives of loss 
and defacement circulating among middle-class Buenos Aires residents, the culprits 
were always again the urban poor who, like the faceless squatters of Cortàzar’s story, 
crept out of their unmarked space to usurp the places of the middle-class.37  
At a time when one’s property was possibly even less expendable than ever, 
the threat of losing one’s home—one’s foremost asset—to squatters had to be taken 
very seriously. Yet the way this experience was constructed and narrated in middle-
class discourse was not limited to pointing out the menace seemingly posited by the 
poor to the middle-class’ quickly vanishing economic capital, but it also essentialized 
cultural and symbolic capital, and spatialized notions of modernity and distinction 
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(Bourdieu 1984) for the sake of symbolically evicting the poor from the places that 
the middle-class claimed as its own.38 Could there be anything more “barbaric” than 
burning expensive hardwood floors to barbecue beef? How could modern principles 
of privacy and hygiene be enforced in a house where all doors, taps, and pipes had 
been removed? In this discourse, the presence of the poor in the places of the middle-
class prospected not only a crime against proprietorship, but also an offense to 
propriety: a propriety that concerned members of the Buenos Aires middle-class 
claimed as quintessential to their identity and practice. While most members of the 
middle-class could do little to effectively protect their property from theft and 
damage, the narratives they disseminated reproduced their entitlements by denying the 
lower class its citizenship in modern Buenos Aires.  
 
Conclusion 
Faced with their own “disconnect” from modernity—a disconnect that 
blatantly contradicted the neoliberal shibboleth of Argentina’s successful 
modernization, in the late 1990s many middle-class Buenos Aires residents 
experienced urban space as a location where the drama of modernization through the 
looking glass struck them with the force of first-hand experience. Fully aware of their 
precarious hold on middle-classness, many of them tried to reiterate their symbolic 
entitlement to a city that they viewed as coessential to their own class identity, and on 
the verge of being swallowed by the disorganizing forces of a reterritorialized “third-
world”. In the attempt to explain and resist their predicament, those who were 
concerned with their own fall from grace inscribed a legacy of modernity into what 
they envisioned as “their” urban space, and erected physical, but most often 
conceptual, boundaries in the hope of safeguarding the social and spatial integrity of 
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middle-class Buenos Aires. Tropes of foreignness, pollution, and propriety 
supplemented practices of segregation and surveillance in the attempt to redress the 
trespassings. Articulated along the distinction between civilization and barbarism, first 
and third world, and modernization and its opposite, pervasive representations of 
spatialized identities and identified spaces helped middle-class residents to reinforce a 
fading social difference, while simultaneously blaming their predicament on graspable 
culprits: those who did not belong in the modern city. 
  
 
                                                 
Endnotes 
 
1 All names are fictional. 
2 Till well into the twentieth century, the Buenos Aires elite had held the monopoly on the definition of 
civilization, which it described as a “matter of style” (cuestión de estilo, Svampa 1992:148-170). Much 
of this bourgeois “style” consisted in a competent appreciation of things European that had to be 
acquired during Grand Tours of Paris and London (Viñas 1982, Orlove 1997). As upper class porteños 
displayed their competent consumption (Appadurai 1989:41) of such products of European civilization 
as French wines and British tweeds, Buenos Aires grew into a sophisticated replica of Paris (Scobie 
1974): a stage where wealthy residents and fashionably dressed passers-by paraded their proficiency in 
the “matters of style” that were imperative for belonging (Scobie 1974:220, Gayol 2000). In his Social 
Justice and the City, Harvey (1973: 310) suggested that the question to be asked when investigating 
inequality in the urban sphere should be “in whose image is space created?” The thriving Buenos Aires 
of the turn of the twentieth century was indisputably created in the image the local bourgeoisie was 
intent in projecting about itself. Its downtown plazas and corridor streets supplied the most adequate 
setting for the persuasive presentation of the bourgeoisie’s social self, thus helping sustain this elite’s 
view about what modernity was and should have been. At the same time, the inscription into the city of 
a class-specific “style” for spatial practice helped legitimize the continuing exclusion of those social 
groups that were increasingly seeking to dismantle the social, political, and geographical boundaries of 
their own disenfranchisement: on one hand, the rising middle-classes of mostly immigrant European 
origin, clamoring to acquire a new relevance in the political life of the country, and on the other, the 
lower classes that, though for a decade only, would eventually manage to reverse their social and 
political invisibility under Perón’s leadership. 
3 The decline of the Buenos Aires’ middle class actually began with the introduction of neoliberalism in 
1976: the year when Videla, the ruthless head of the junta that “disappeared” tens of thousands of 
Argentines, entrusted the economic management of the country to Martínez de Hoz.  Martínez de Hoz 
dismantled the concentration of economic power in the state, and pursued foreign investments into the 
increasingly liberalized Argentine market (Rock 1985:368). For some, these were the years of the plata 
dulce (easy money) (Colás 1994). For most middle- and especially lower-middle-class families, 
however, this was the beginning of a steep decline. 
4 Argentina’s social and economic crisis became even more acute under Fernando de la Rúa’s 1999-
2001 presidency, and eventually led to the December 2001 riots and the street protests in which the 
disgruntled Buenos Aires middle-class participated actively by banging pots and pans (cacerolazos).  
5 On class as discursively constituted, see Ortner 2003. 
6 Between 1992 and 1996, 93,760 Bolivian nationals reportedly settled in Argentina. The second 
largest immigrant group was formed by US nationals, with 87,154 individuals,  followed by 32,837 
Chileans, 21,951 Paraguayans, 5,368 Brazilians, 4,798 Peruvians, and 3,660 Uruguayans (Szulik and 
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Valiente 1999:240). Yet another immigrant group that kept growing during the 1990s is that of the 
Koreans, with an estimated presence of 32,000 as of 1996 (Courtis 2000:18).    
7 By the same token, one may argue that the visible “intrusion” of the poor into the city of the 
privileged was also instrumental to the fantasy of a homogeneously white and homogeneously 
bourgeois urban space (Deutsche 1996:278)—one whose normative desirability was enhanced through 
its very same defacement (Taussig 1999:38-39). 
8 Yet, it would be incorrect to claim that the Buenos Aires’ middle-classes monolithically opposed 
Menem’s neoliberal government. In fact, with its spectacularization of a consumable first world 
modernity, the latter exerted a degree of seduction on many middle-class porteños. On this topic, see 
Guano (2002). 
9 The elitist requirement of proficiency in the rules of civilization continued to mark the antagonized 
bourgeoisie’s discourse throughout Perón’s tenure as the head of the Argentine state. As it dismissed 
the “sweaty, loud… ill-mannered, and criminal-minded” (Ciria 1983:312) crowds of the “shirtless” 
convening in their newly claimed downtown plazas, the porteño elite kept charging Peronists with 
occupying a place where they did not belong. The fault of the lower class mobs and their 
representatives was that of no longer “politely keeping themselves elsewhere” (Koptiuch 1996:219), 
but rather materializing right at the heart of the bourgeois city as a massive presence whose demand for 
citizenship could no longer be ignored. 
10 The en-masse appearance of Perón’s supporters in downtown Buenos Aires was the epiphany of a 
presence that had been ignored for too long, confined as it had been to the geographical and social 
margins of the city or the rural interior of the country. As the presidential Plaza de Mayo—the very 
heart of bourgeois Buenos Aires--kept filling up with raucous crowds of Peronist supporters drumming 
their bombos and chanting slogans to Evita, public invocations to the “shirtless” and the “greasers” as 
the true embodiment of the pueblo argentino (the Argentine people) became the staple of Peronist 
propaganda (Ciria 1983:277). To underscore their expropriation of the social and political heart of 
Buenos Aires, Peronist officers even planned to install a gigantic (60 by 40 meters) monument to the 
descamisado right at the center of Plaza de Mayo (Pittelli and Somoza Rodríguez 1995). 
11 The social invisibility of the Buenos Aires’ poor was partly reproduced through a widespread social 
fatalism. The indigence that afflicts so many Argentines is what Argentine sociologists call “structural 
poverty” (pobreza estructural) (Minujín 1997). The nueva pobreza--the poverty of the middle-class of 
European descent--is a new phenomenon: one that several of my informants described as an unnatural 
disaster that is reversing the upward mobility of this middle-class’ immigrant ancestors. Due, among 
others, to the close relationship between the Buenos Aires media and their predominantly middle-class 
publics, throughout the late 1990s the new poverty was granted a high public visibility. Structural 
poverty, instead, was often viewed by those who had never experienced it personally as a natural and 
unavoidable matter of fact. As Carlos, an engineer in his early sixty, put it, “A lot of people in 
Argentina are very poor… That’s the way it has always been. You can’t change that”. Propaganda 
aside, the consensus in the late 1990s was that structural poverty had become worse since the onset of 
neoliberalism. Those who were inclined to support president Menem’s rhetoric of the need for a 
“surgery without anesthesia” on the ailing national body dismissed this deterioration as collateral 
damage. Others, instead, blamed the conjuncture squarely on the lower classes’ allegedly mindless 
support for the ruling Peronist/neoliberal party (Guano 2003). 
12 By 1997, seventeen slums were thought to exist on the territory of Buenos Aires city (Capital 
Federal). With the exception of the slum of Retiro, an upscale and very central neighborhood, all the 
officially recorded shantytowns were located in the relatively poorer south of the city. Many more 
dotted the immense territory of the Greater Buenos Aires. 
13 While most of my middle-class informants expressed anxieties about the vicinity of a villa regardless 
of gender and age, men often phrased their concerns in terms of the danger villas posited to their wives 
and children—like Diego, a manager who lived in San Isidro and forced his reluctant wife to keep a 
cell phone with her because she drove by a villa on the way back from work, or Andrés, who worried 
that the children of his apartment complex in la Boca were increasingly targeted by youth gangs from 
the nearby Isla Maciel slum, and campaigned to have fences and gates installed around the block. 
14 On the representation of the Buenos Aires slums as “no go” areas, see also Auyero (2000b:62).  
15 In November 2001, a large number of the volunteers who were to run the census of several Buenos 
Aires slums refused to enter the villas, thus causing what the local newspaper Página 12 called “black 
holes” in the Buenos Aires census (Dandan 2001). 
16 On the absence of slums from the maps of Buenos Aires, see also Grassi (1996). 
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17 Several of my informants attributed the status of “inmigrante” exclusively to the Europeans who 
settled in Buenos Aires between the late nineteenth and the mid twentieth century. The immigrants 
from neighboring Latin American countries were, in their words, only extranjeros: foreigners.  
18 Porteños are residents of Buenos Aires city. 
19At the turn of the twentieth century, for example, working class Italian immigrants were thought to 
carry a biological/moral herencia (heritage) that made them into dangerously polluting elements in a 
society where they did not belong.  
20 Many of the men from the shantytowns made a living by taking on temporary jobs in the 
construction business for wages that were well below the legal minimum. Women were often employed 
as maids. Slum dwellers would also work in sweatshops, or do changas: occasional chores that were 
paid in cash. 
21 Since the 2001 crisis, another category of scavengers has grown exponentially: that of the cartoneros 
who focus primarily on recyclable materials. 
22 The neoliberal party that ruled Argentina between 1989 and 1999 was, in fact, the Peronist Partido 
Justicialista. Many of the votes reaped by the PJ had come from the Buenos Aires’ shantytowns 
through a Peronist network that sought to promote the political loyalty of villa residents by distributing 
favors and assistance. For an analysis of Peronist networks in a Buenos Aires villa, see Auyero 2000b.  
23 On the discursive articulations between the middle-classes’ anti-Peronist and anti-neoliberal 
sentiments and their antagonism to the lower class they accused of supporting President Menem’s 
regime, see Guano (2003). 
24 Upon returning from her Grand Tour, a porteña lawyer expressed her surprise and sadness at seeing 
garbage littering the streets of London. “You can’t walk around without stepping on trash” she 
informed me, and then concluded: “the British do not litter: the Pakistani and Indian immigrants do. 
They eat their junk and then drop whatever is left in the streets.” 
25 Data from the Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censo (INDEC). 
26 According to Isla and Miguez (2003), the “moral panic” that blamed the rise in crime rates squarely 
on the Buenos Aires’ poor was instrumental to covering up for the responsibilities of the neoliberal 
state. The latter ranged from the increase in mortality rates caused by malnutrition and the difficulty of 
accessing a largely privatized health care system to the murders and robberies committed by 
bonaerense police officers.  
27 A current trope in the discourse on villas and criminality is that of the favelización of the Buenos 
Aires’ slums: a reterritorialization of Brazilian slums (favelas) that, once again, associates local poverty 
with foreign danger.   
28 Not only did the more or less hidden nostalgia for the safety allegedly guaranteed by the totalitarian 
regime fail to identify state violence as a criminal practice, but it also occulted the historical and 
political continuities between the indifference to civil society professed by Menem’s neoliberal 
government and its brutal repression at the hands of the military state in its various embodiments (Isla 
1999). 
29 For an account of living conditions in villas, tenements, and casas tomadas in the Buenos Aires of the 
1990s, see Powers (2001). 
30 In 2001, the number of empty and/or abandoned properties in Buenos Aires was estimated at around 
40,000, for a total of 3,000,000 square meters.  
31 Between 1991 and 2002, the Argentine peso was pegged to the US dollar. 
32 Data reported in Página/12 11/26/2000. 
33 On the fear of police brutality and corruption, see also Isla and Miguez (2003). 
34 In 1999, President Menem issued a law mandating immediate eviction as soon as a homeowner 
reported the presence of squatters in his or her property.  
35 And yet, the presence in Buenos Aires of vacant rundown properties was often instrumental to 
developers who bought cheap and sold at much higher prices. One example is the area known as 
Abasto. The Abasto produce market was closed in 1948, after which the surrounding neighborhood 
underwent a steep decline. Due to its vacant houses, empty lots and storehouses, and the high incidence 
of squatting, the Abasto has been known till recently as the “Bronx porteño.” In the 1990s, however, 
the Alto Palermo corporation bought the market for the sake of installing a large shopping mall on its 
premises, along with a gated residential complex endowed with swimming pool, solarium, and jogging 
path. As soon as the purchase had been closed, the porteño police initiated an unprecedented eviction 
campaign in Abasto (Carman n.d.).  
36 The trope of the “barbaric” usurpation of a middle- or upper-class home allegedly perpetrated by 
lower class individuals is well-sedimented in the social imaginary of the Buenos Aires middle-class, 
dating back to the bourgeois resistance to Peronism in the mid-twentieth century. 
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37 In 2000, the state-run Canal 7 television station broadcasted a series, Okupa, featuring the 
vicissitudes of a handful of drug-addict squatters. Instead of presenting romanticized underclass heroes, 
director Bruno Stagnaro declaredly purported to tell “things as they are.” As a result, the series 
indulged in a disturbingly crude realism. Though successful with a large segment of middle-class 
audiences, Stagnaro’s epatez le bourgeois strategy was not well received by the real occupants of the 
Buenos Aires’ casas tomadas, who resented the stereotypes of squatters as criminals, drug-addicts, and 
prostitutes. 
38 As Bourdieu (1999:128-129) pointed out, those individuals who, upon moving into a place, fail to 
fulfill the conditions that that space tacitly requires, end up symbolically degrading it—and 
symbolically degrading themselves at the same time. 
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